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Executive Summary
The main objective of this deliverable is to provide a set of proof-of-concept proto-
types to illustrate some particular solutions developed within CORTEX. Addition-
ally, these proof-of-concept prototypes should also be seen as technology demonstra-
tors, which will provide relevant input for the construction of integrated CORTEX
demo applications (see deliverable WP4-D8).
More specifically, this deliverable includes the following five proof-of-concept
prototype demos:
• Cooperating Autonomous Robots Demo
• Adaptation and Fail-safety in Cooperating Cars Demo
• Sentient Vehicle Demo
• Sentient Room Demo
• Demo of Framework for Testing Safety-Critical Sentient Applications
The main issues focused by these demos include: a) communication through
event-channels; b) the use of sensor technology; c) dealing with timeliness and fail-
safety requirements; d) QoS adaptation; e) context awareness; f) sensor fusion; g)
the use of a component framework. The present document essentially provides an
overview of these demos, pointing out their objectives and describing their main
steps by means of a storyboard.
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1 Introduction
There are several challenges that must be addressed when programming real-time
sentient objects and applications. However, as identified in deliverable WP1-D1:
Definition of Application Scenarios, each application scenario stresses in different
ways the problems that have to be addressed. Therefore, we believe that a correct
approach to the demonstration and assessment of our results is to focus on different
and representative applications in order to cover a larger number of issues.
In order to achieve this goal, and according to the work plan defined in the
CORTEX technical annex, we need to demonstrate the feasibility and validity of
the several solutions that have been proposed so far. This has been done through
the construction of several proof-of-concept prototypes, each of them focusing and
demonstrating one or more of these solutions. Given that we are also working
towards the definition of the final application scenarios that will be used to demon-
strate the several CORTEX concepts, these proof-of-concept prototypes have been
defined and constructed having in mind the anticipated final applications, in order
to allow an easier integration of the several solutions. The preliminary results con-
cerning this integration are in fact presented in deliverable WP4-D8: Analysis and
design of application scenarios.
Given the above, deliverable WP3-D7 is not a text deliverable. Instead, it
consists of a set of proof-of-concept prototypes, which are demonstrable, and which
include four demonstrators related to application scenarios and an additional demon-
strator of a supporting tool for testing real-time sentient applications. More specif-
ically, the proof-of-concept prototype demonstrators are the following:
Cooperating Autonomous Robots Demo: this demo focuses on coordination
aspects, on the use of event-channels as a means to support coordination and
on the use of sensor technology;
Adaptation and Fail-safety in Cooperating Cars Demo: this demo focuses
on the problem of dealing with timeliness and safety requirements, using adap-
tation and event-based communication;
Sentient Vehicle Demo: this demo addresses the problems of context awareness,
sensor fusion and adaptation, based on the information provided by a range
of different sensors;
Sentient Room Demo: this demo focuses on the use of sensor technology associ-
ated to the programming of sentient object components and it illustrates the
use of a component framework;
Demo of Framework for Testing Safety-Critical Sentient Applications:
the objective of this demo is to highlight the capabilities of the testing
framework, using a simulated scenario of moving objects.
The present document provides a brief report on the background of these proof-
of-concept prototypes. It includes a summary of the prototypes rationale, structure,
and purpose. We make it clear, however, that deliverable WP3-D7 consists of the
actual proof-of-concept prototypes and not on this document.
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2 Cooperating Autonomous Robots Demo
Technical Objectives:
• dynamic subscriptions to event channels;
• dynamic configuration and plug&play;
• coordination of a distributed heterogeneous sensor infrastructure;
• exploitation of remote sensors in local control.
Plot of the demo:
Starting from some initial state and position, the robots try to achieve a coordinated
motion pattern (platoon). The experimental set-up guarantees that the coordinated
action can be only achieved and maintained if the robots share the environment
perception provided by their embedded sensors. As the robots progress from the
initially uncoordinated to the coordinated state, their information needs will change
and involve the sensor information from other robots. The application copes with
the evolving context by dynamically cancelling subscriptions and subscribing to new
specific event types. The context includes proximity and relative motion of robots.
Demonstration of technical achievements:
The demonstration will show the coordinated interaction of autonomous mobile
robots exploiting the event channels of the publisher/subscriber protocol. The
robots have different sensors, thus perceiving different aspects of the environment.
The demonstration highlights that:
1. An individual mobile robot does not have the capability of assessing the com-
plete environmental context just based on local sensors. Therefore robots must
cooperate.
2. During the demonstration, the roles of the information producer and infor-
mation consumer are dynamically changed. This will show the possibility to
dynamically subscribe and unsubscribe to channels as a publisher or a sub-
scriber. Selective information access is provided by the event middleware, by
means of subscriptions and event filtering.
3. The activity of the robots and their internal state is continuously monitored
by an external control station by subscribing to the respective event chan-
nels and visualized online. The supervisory system has also the possibility
to send control commands to the robots. The monitor tracks internal system
activities of the publisher/subscriber middleware as announcements, subscrip-
tions, un-subscriptions, events, detection of new context and distributed state
transitions.
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3 Adaptation and Fail-safety in Cooperating Cars
Demo
Context:
The car of the future will communicate with other cars or entities in its proximity,
over a wireless link, to achieve cooperation and coordination in certain occasions
(this is one of the scenarios described in WP1-D1). The demo described here tar-
gets a more specific scenario where cars will have to achieve coordination when
approaching a cross with no traffic signs where the right-priority rule applies.
In this scenario, each car periodically transmits an event (with its position,
speed and direction) to the other cars, so that each one maintains always a correct
perception of the reality, i.e. a real-time image of the reality (let’s call it RT-image).
To achieve this RT-image, events have to be timely delivered. Only in this way
it is possible to secure that the RT-image is consistent (apart a bounded error) with
the reality and that car crashes can be avoided. Intuitively, the delivery deadline
of an event is related with the sender speed: a higher speed requires a smaller
deadline. If a car detects a deadline violation on an event it should receive, it
must (timely) enter a fail-safe state (e.g. stopping) because its RT-image may have
become inconsistent. Moreover, when the environment is ”slow”, each car should
adapt their speed (slowing down) to avoid the occurrence of missed deadlines (i.e.
timing failures). Without this adaptation to the environment (i.e., to the QoS
provided by the communication substrate), a speedy car in a degraded environment
could cause all other cars in its proximity (i.e., that need to receive its events very
quickly) to stop.
Description:
The demo unrolls in a city area where it only exists perpendicular streets. There
are 3 cars (which we depict with a different color: red, green or blue), moving in a
different street and always in the same direction (up, down, left or right). Figure 1
presents a snapshot of the streets and cars representation, in the demo.
Figure 1: Snapshot of the demo’s streets and cars. Red car is going right, green car
is going up and blue car is going left.
All cars have the same control logic in each cross, advancing if the two following
conditions are satisfied:
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• there is no car in front;
• there is no car approaching from the right.
Each car has a position, speed and direction. All this information is periodically
transmitted in the form of events to all other cars, such that each one can maintain
a RT-image of other cars’ position.
A car has also two optional features that are directly related with the goal of
this demo:
Fail-Safety When this feature is ON, each event is marked with a deadline that
depends on the sender speed. The delivery delay of events is measured using
the Timely Computing Base (TCB) distributed timing failure detection ser-
vice (the TCB model and its services were introduced in WP3-D4 and their
implementation explained in WP3-D5) and if a timing failure is detected, a
fail-safety handler that stops the car is timely executed;
QoS-Adaptation When this feature is ON, two operational modes can further be
considered:
Coverage stability In this mode, cars adapt their speed according to the
pair <QoS allowed by the environment, desired coverage>. More specifi-
cally, each car constructs a Probability Density Function (PDF) using the
measurements provided by the TCB distributed measurements service,
deriving a coverage (see Dependable QoS Adaptation section in WP2-
D3) for each measurement (which is represented by a <measurement,
coverage> function). Then, at each instant, the measurement associ-
ated with the desired coverage is used to calculate the (possibly new)
car speed. Note that this conversion between speed and measurement
entirely depends on the cars’ logic;
Coverage awareness In this mode, at each instant, cars know the cover-
age associated with the pair <QoS allowed by the environment, current
speed>. The PDF function described above is also used but now focusing
on the coverage associated with the measurement that results (according
to the cars’ logic) from the current car speed.
Architecture of the demo:
In the demo, each car is represented by an IPAQ that simulates its position (in a real
scenario, a location mechanism such as a GPS receiver would do this job), speed
(changeable through the IPAQ’s car interface) and direction (always the same).
IPAQs communicate using IEEE 802.11b[1] in ad-hoc mode. Besides the IPAQs,
there is a monitor application running in a laptop also using 802.11b ad-hoc to
communicate with cars. The architecture is depicted in figure 2.
The monitor application is divided in three types of panels:
Reality View panel shows the actual reality allowing to observe cars behavior
and therefore to detect car crashes (figure 1);
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Figure 2: Demo architecture.
Master Control panel allows to turn ON/OFF certain car features, such as fail-
safety and QoS-adaptation;
Car Control panel there exists one panel of this type per car. Each one has three
parts:
Speed control allows to change car speed, increasing or decreasing it;
Statistics presents some car statistics: average delay of events received, num-
ber of events lost;
QoS-adaptation control allows to specify the parameters (e.g. coverage) of
the QoS-adaptation feature and presents the <measurement, coverage>
function described above.
Guideline for the demo:
The demo presentation is divided in 3 major parts:
• Enumeration of the various components;
• Fail-safety demo;
• QoS-adaptation demo.
Components
The cars interface and the various parts of the monitor application interface are
explained.
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Fail-Safety Demo
One extra feature of the monitor application is the possibility of injecting an electric
blackout in a car’s landscape, which we call “fog”. When this fog is injected in a car,
it stops seeing other cars approaching (i.e. all events sent by other cars are lost).
With the fail-safety feature OFF and if we inject fog in a car, car crashes are
more likely to happen. We show a car crash happening in these conditions. Then we
turn ON fail-safety and we see that the fog-injected car stops before any car crash
occurs. This happens because when an event is lost, a timing failure occurs and,
as described above, when the fail-safety feature is ON, a timing failure originates
the shift to a fail-safe state (in this case, the car stops). When a car enters the
fail-safe state, a siren appears in the monitor application’s car control panel. A car
can recover from a fail-safe state as soon as a timely event is received from all cars
from which a late event was received. After the recovery, the siren disappears.
QoS-Adaptation Demo
Even without fog, when fail-safety feature is ON, cars obviously stop if they detect
a timing failure. The probability of an event to suffer a timing failure is directly
proportional to the sender speed. As mentioned above, in the context, a speedy
car in a degraded environment could cause all other cars in its proximity (i.e. that
should receive its events) to constantly detect timing failures and therefore to stop.
To avoid this, we turn ON QoS-adaptation in coverage stability mode. If we
select a sufficiently high coverage (through a coverage slider that appears in each
car control panel), cars adjust their speed to reflect the environment conditions and
in this way the probability of a timing failure to occur decreases. Note that these
environment conditions can be different from car to car because in this demo they
are mapped into the PDF function constructed with the delays of events received
from the other cars. These differences can be visually perceived by analyzing the
<measurement, coverage> function presented in each car control panel.
If, for a certain car, we switch to coverage awareness mode, the QoS-adaptation
feature stops adapting its speed and starts informing about the coverage of the
current speed. When the speed is increased, the coverage decreases, and when the
speed is decreased, the coverage increases. Note that even if speed is not changed,
coverage will change when environment conditions suffer modifications.
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4 Sentient Vehicle Demo
Storyboard:
• The sentient vehicles sensors examine the road environment and upon deter-
mining it is safe to begin its journey, it does so (figure 3).
Figure 3:
• As it approaches its desired speed (the speed limit), its stereovision system
detects another vehicle within its protected zone. The vehicles long range
laser tells the vehicle that the detected vehicle is travelling at a slower speed
(figure 4).
Figure 4:
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• The vehicle cannot safely overtake because of the vehicle in the other lane
and reduces its speed so that the detected vehicle remains outside of its safety
envelope (figure 5).
Figure 5:
• The vehicle establishes a communication channel with the blocking vehicle and
requests it to change lane. The blocking vehicle checks if it is safe to do so and
then performs the maneuver. This collaboration is beneficial for both vehicles
in the long term (figure 6).
Figure 6:
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• Although the vehicle has the right of way at the junction, it has received a
broadcast event from an ambulance, requesting a clear path. The vehicle waits
at the junction until the area is clear (figure 7).
Figure 7:
• The ambulance passes and the vehicle detects that it is safe to resume its
journey. It automatically alters its desired speed since it has changed from a
two lane road to a single lane road (figure 8).
Figure 8:
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5 Sentient Room Demo
The sentient room demo aims to build an intelligent environment using the sentient
object paradigm. We have set the sentient room demo in a semi-public space the
Innovative Interactions Laboratory (IIL) in computing department at Lancaster
University. The main body of the IIL is the living room with a size of 7m*5.25m, and
it is illustrated in Figure 9. The living room contains visual devices, e.g., cameras,
plasma screens; audio devices, e.g., speakers, microphones; and conventional room
devices, e.g., lights, air-conditioner.
Figure 9: The semi-public living room of IIL.
At the entrance of the room, an iris scanner and a library card reader (Figure
10) are installed, which can be used to identify the person who enters the room.
Figure 10: Iris scanner and library card reader at the entrance of IIL.
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We have chosen to model the hardware devices as sentient sensor and actu-
ator software objects, e.g., the iris scanner, plasma screen, environmental sensor,
etc. We have engineered an event channel based on the TCD’s STEAM and built
a preliminary prototype – the personalized homepage launching service. This ser-
vice consists of the iris scanner sensor, the plasma screen actuator, and a sentient
object performing reasoning in the middle. The prototype works as the follows:
the iris scanner sensor produces a recognized event in XML format when someone
enters the room; the sentient object consumes this event, maps the user identity
that is extracted from the recognized event content to his/her homepage URL, and
produces a display event; the plasma screen actuator consumes the display event
and launches Internet explorer to the specific URL (this scenario could easily be ex-
panded to incorporate other actuations, such as controlling physical room attributes:
temperature, light etc.).
This demonstrator contains the core sensor, actuator, and sentient object com-
ponents of the CORTEX programming model. A key component missing from our
demonstrator is the inference engine or controlling logic in the sentient object. We
intend to put the inference engine into the sentient object, and then refine our
proof-of-concept prototype – a more sophisticated homepage launching service. The
focus of the prototype is to develop the contextual reasoning component within our
sentient object prototype, in order to ’give intelligence’ to the room, so that it can
decide how to display homepage when there are multiple persons coming to the
room.
Figure 11: How should the sentient room display the third person’s homepage?
The room can have different possible ways on how to display multiple persons
homepage: it can either display the homepage of the person who has the highest
priority (the professor) or split the screen to display multiple homepages. No matter
how the room decides to display the homepages, it has to have some decision making
capability or intelligence, based on the limited contextual and sensor data available
to it.
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6 Demo of Framework for Testing Safety-Critical
Sentient Applications
Several classes of sentient applications have safety-critical requirements. These
requirements emerge from safety rules imposed by the environment and must be
preserved by the system under any circumstance. Some examples of safety rules
include keeping the temperature of a nuclear reactor under a threshold value, avoid-
ing collisions between moving objects (e.g. planes, cars), etc. Some safety-critical
systems have real-time requirements. In these systems, the computations must com-
ply with timeliness constraints so that safety rules can be secured. Since failures
of safety-critical systems can lead to catastrophic scenarios (e.g. human life loss,
environmental disasters), this kind of systems must be highly dependable.
The correctness of safety-critical systems depends on their ability to secure safety
rules imposed by the environment. These safety rules are commonly expressed
as a set of requirements imposed on the behavior of both software and hardware
components. Therefore, to test the correctness of these kind of systems it is often
not sufficient to simply evaluate the software components. It is also necessary to
deploy hardware devices in order to test their correct operation.
However, in large-scale sentient applications that involve the use of large
amounts of expensive hardware (e.g. an application involving several vehicles ap-
proaching a road intersection), it is not possible to acquire all the necessary hardware
devices to develop and test the applications because of cost reasons. Furthermore,
since safety-critical requirements may also have to be preserved during the test
phases, it is too risky to make these tests using ”real” hardware. For example, test-
ing fly-by-wire planes should not be done with real aircrafts. This line of reasoning
is also applied in our everyday life. For instance, driving schools teach the basic
driving principles to their students using driving emulators instead of real vehicles
(the reason is obvious).
Thus being, it is obvious that using real hardware devices to test sentient ap-
plications may not be always possible. In order to address this issue we propose a
software platform for the emulation of real environments, which can be used to test
safety-critical, safety-related, or even money-critical CORTEX applications. This
framework may be a very useful tool in the development of critical systems, in the
sense that it complements all the other software engineering methodologies tradition-
ally employed in this area (e.g. formal methods for the specification, development
and verification of software and hardware systems, redundancy).
In what follows we describe the proposed emulator and a fictitious environ-
ment that was created for the purpose of demonstrating the emulator. Moreover,
we also describe a distributed sentient application that controls a process in the
mentioned environment. The application was implemented using ATES (Adaptable
Timed Event Service) publishing/subscribing services (see deliverable WP3-D5).
The software emulator is illustrated in figure 12. There exists a central compo-
nent that emulates a real environment (we call to this module Controlled System
Emulator, or CSE ). The environment emulated in this demonstration is rather sim-
ple. Nevertheless it can be as elaborated as necessary, depending on the application
purposes. The fictitious environment consists of a bi-dimensional space delimited by
walls in which four virtual controlled entities move at a certain speed and in several
directions. Each entity is defined by four physical attributes: a position < x, y > in
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CONTROLLED SYSTEM
EMULATOR
Virtual Instrumentation Interface
sensor
actuator
virtual controlled entities
Monitor
CLOCK
Figure 12: Emulation system.
the space, a shape, a speed and a direction. Physical laws such as friction or kinetic
energy transfers are not modelled in this (environment) demonstration. Therefore,
entities tend to keep their movements in a frictionless space unless they collide with
a wall or with other moving entity, changing their direction in such a case.
The functioning of the emulator is engaged by a periodic clock signal with a
known frequency. The environment emulated inside the CSE is updated at each
clock tick, being the positions of all the controlled entities updated accordingly to
their evolution rules, in this case, speeds and directions.
The emulation system has a local monitoring component that provides a human
perceptible representation of the emulated environment. Periodically, the monitor
gathers the state of the emulated environment from the CSE and displays a graphical
representation of the latter to the user. It is worth to mention that the refresh rate
of graphical frames in the monitoring component and the rate of update operations
performed on the emulated environment (triggered by the clock) are unlikely to be
the same. Firstly, when the CSE is clocked at high frequencies (e.g. 1000Hz) it
is virtually impossible to enforce the graphical hardware to display all the states
of the emulation. Moreover, the definitive restriction is the human inability to
process visual information above a threshold frequency. Despite the impossibility
of representing graphically all the states of the emulation, it is however guaranteed
that all relevant events occurred in the emulated environment (e.g. collisions in our
example) are notified to the user, either by providing counters of relevant events, or
through suitable graphical representations. Figure 13 shows the monitor developed
for this demonstration and the way in which collisions are notified to the user.
Figure 13: Monitoring component.
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The CSE provides a virtual instrumentation interface composed of sensors and
actuators to control applications. In our example, for each entity emulated inside the
CSE there exists an associated sensor/actuator pair. A sensor allows applications to
acquire the state of a controlled entity. The state of an entity is a triple containing
its position, speed and direction. The actuators can be used by applications to
change the movement (speed and/or direction) of the entities emulated inside the
CSE 1.
Each sensor/actuator pair is locally made available to the controller application
to allow distributed applications (i.e. CORTEX sentient applications) to access this
instrumentation interface. In order to provide sensors with bounded errors towards
the real state of the emulated environment, and actuators whose actions are timely
propagated to the emulated environment, it is necessary to use communication links
provided with the adequate timeliness to connect each sensor/actuator pair on a
remote machine to the CSE central unit. At the bottom of figure 14 is depicted an
internal view of the virtual instrumentation interface provided by the emulator.
Publishing/Subscribing Network
E
M
u
L
A
T
I
O
N
S
Y
S
T
E
M
Virtual Instrumentation
Interface
C
O
R
T
E
X
S
Y
S
T
E
M
Figure 14: A CORTEX system with the emulator.
In this demonstration the entities emulated inside the CSE are shaped as four
colored balls: red, green, blue and yellow balls. These balls emulate physical entities
and prefigure real objects with similar dynamics. These can be cars, robots or even
sub-atomic particles.
As it was mentioned above in this text, the balls (our virtual controlled entities)
move in a bi-directional space changing their directions when collisions take place.
Due to the absence of emulating functions for physical laws such as friction or
energy transfers between objects when collisions take place, the balls tend to keep
their speed constant (however, as it will be seen ahead, the speed can be changed by
a control application). Initially, the balls start their movements at random speeds
and directions.
A ball is a passive entity that moves in an uncontrolled manner unaware of
its surrounding environment. However, the goal of the application described in
1For the sake of simplicity, we consider that a single sensing device provides the entire state of
an emulated entity. The same is also true for actuators; a single actuator handles several types of
commands.
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the following paragraphs is to control the movement of the balls in order to avoid
collisions among them, which is the safety rule that must be ensured by the system.
The infrastructure that was used to build this framework and demonstration is
illustrated in figure 15. The emulator runs in a dedicated machine that executes a
real-time version of the Linux operating system (RTAI-Linux ). The CSE runs as a
hard real-time task of RTAI kernel and is executed periodically (it is the clock signal
of the CSE ). The monitoring application is a X11 application (user-level process)
with a GUI that periodically acquires the state of the CSE (through an RT-FIFO
device) and displays a graphical representation of the emulated space and balls.
Each CORTEX machine runs a sentient object that controls one of the emulated
balls, using a virtual sensor and a virtual actuator as depicted in figure 14.
The instrumentation interface of the CSE is spread throughout the machines
(CORTEX system nodes) deployed in this demonstration. Each sensor/actuator
pair associated to a ball is locally made available to the respective sentient con-
troller. There are user dedicated real-time communication channels in order to en-
dow remote sensors and actuators with the necessary timeliness. For example, the
sensor/actuator pair related to the yellow ball is deployed on the CORTEX node
where the controller for this ball executes and is connected to the CSE through
a dedicated real-time communication channel. Since sensor/actuator pairs may be
deployed on different machines, a ball controller may not access (and should not,
even if allowed to) other ball instrumentation interfaces.
CORTEX node
(yellow ball)
CORTEX node
(red ball)
CORTEX node
(green ball)
CORTEX node
(blue ball)
Ball
Controller
user
kernel
ATES
deamon
TCB
Ball
Controller
ATES
deamon
TCB
Ball
Controller
ATES
deamon
TCB
Ball
Controller
ATES
deamon
TCB
X11
Application
Periodic
RT-Task
Publishing/
Subscribing
Event Channel
EMULATION 
ARTIFACT: Is not 
part of CORTEX 
System!
emulation node
user
kernel
user
kernel
user
kernel
yellow ball
sensing
yellow ball
actuation
red ball
actuation
red ball
sensing
green ball
sensing
green ball
actuation
blue ball
sensing
blue ball
actuation
Figure 15: Application setup.
Sentient objects use ATES services to publish and subscribe information con-
cerned with the control algorithm. A sentient object publishes the position, speed
and direction of the ball that it controls, and subscribes the same information from
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the other sentient objects in order to build a real-time image of the overall system.
This real-time image will contain the position of every ball and will allow to decide
if and how to actuate on the controlled ball. The details of the control algorithm
are out of the scope of this document.
It is important to observe that this emulated scenario could be mapped in a real
environment in which each ball could be materialized by a physical entity (e.g. a
robot) with an embodied control unit (e.g. a micro-controller) and real sensors (e.g.
GPS ) and actuators (e.g. motor actuators).
In this application scenario, the most important requirement is to ensure that
every ball controller has a consistent view (in time and space) of the environment,
so that they can know each other’s positions and so that collisions are avoided. Fur-
thermore, given that: a) controllers periodically disseminate information containing
the information of their controlled balls (position, speed and direction), and b) each
controller must achieve a consistent view in time and space of other ball positions,
there exist some timeliness, or real-time, requirements (network communications
and local processing) that must be verified. As a matter of fact, in order to ensure
that controllers only make decisions that preserve the safety of the overall system,
it is necessary that, at every instant, each ball controller knows the position of all
other ball with a known and bounded positioning error. To achieve that, a max-
imum ball speed must be defined and each controller must perform the following
computations:
• disseminate the information of its controlled ball to the other ball controllers
in a timely manner, that is, periodically and with a bounded communication
latency. Based on the information received from other ball controllers, each
controller should represent internally in a real-time image its perception of the
surrounding environment;
• timely process the information when it is received from other controllers. Ac-
tuation in response to specific conditions (e.g. change the ball direction to
avoid colliding with another one) must be also timely undertaken.
Temporal correctness of the execution of the above computations implies that
the computational infrastructure where the application is running exhibits real-time
properties. If this is not fulfilled, the application might not be able to secure the
required safety property and therefore balls may collide.
Sentient objects use ATES publishing/subscribing services to disseminate the
state of their controlled balls and to acquire the information related to the other
balls. Although ATES services do not enforce real-time properties, ATES is built
on top of a Timely Computing Base and therefore can use the TCB timing failure
detection service. The application makes use of these TFD primitives in order to
force the system to switch to a fail-safe state in a timely manner when timing
failures occur, that is, when the expected real-time properties are not met by the
infrastructure. The obvious fail-safety procedure in this case is to force the affected
balls to stop.
In mobile environments, where devices may travel through several networks, it is
difficult to secure real-time properties for the underlying infrastructures. Moreover,
mobile environments are inherently dynamic (e.g. several devices entering and leav-
ing a network) and therefore timing properties of the services provided by a network
(that is, the supported Quality-of-Service (QoS) may oscillate over time.
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Although the safety of the system is ensured by using the timing failure detection
primitives of ATES, it is however desirable to minimize the activation of fail-safety
procedures. In fact, it is important to ensure the progress of system applications
even in situations of degraded timeliness of the underlying infrastructure. Therefore,
some mechanisms must be employed to prevent systems from being blocked on fail-
safe states, to which they switch because of incorrect assumptions about system
timing properties that lead to recurrent timing failures.
Consider, for instance, that the balls were cars and that the fail-safety procedure
consisted in forcing the cars to break suddenly. In this scenario, it would be desirable
to reduce the activation of fail-safety procedures to the minimum, to preserve the
breaking engine of the car and, of course, to keep passengers happy! On the other
hand, since the objective is to keep moving as fast as possible, this raises a tradeoff
with the need to minimize the activation of fail-safety procedures.
ATES provides extensions for dependable QoS adaption, giving feedback to
applications of the changing conditions of the infrastructure. The controllers use
theseQoS adaptation extensions to update their timing requirements to the available
QoS. Moreover, they adjust the speed of the balls (issuing proper commands to the
actuators) according to the changing timing requirements and thus minimizing the
activation of fail-safety procedures.
In this demonstration it is possible to observe the following issues:
• the effect of timing failures, leading to collisions between balls;
• the significance of being able to detect timing failures in a timely manner,
forcing the balls to stop quickly in order to avoid collisions;
• the importance of the adaptation procedures, allowing to smooth the move-
ment of the balls.
Furthermore, in order to observe the behavior of the application under several
timeliness conditions, we have developed a module that allows us to inject artificial
timing failures (possibly omissions) on the ATES publishing/subscribing channel.
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